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Introduction
The sad story of the Netherlands' negative response to Indonesia's struggle for inde­
pendence is only too well known. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, vehement resistance in 
the Dutch East Indies, two military actions against the Indonesian Republic, and recurrent 
international intervention were needed to induce the Dutch government finally to transfer 
sovereignty to its colony in December 1949.
The liquidation of the Dutch overseas empire in Southeast Asia was an extremely 
painful experience for the political parties at home. Ranking foremost among them was the 
Dutch Labor Party. Since the 1930s the social democrats had identified themselves with the 
general movement toward independence and decolonization. After 1945, however, their 
party was co-responsible for the ill-fated course of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict.
A major source for this essay was my interviews with Mr. Goedhart on October 9 and 29, and November 15, 
1982 about his political role in the Indonesian situation. I am most grateful to Mrs. M.A.A.W. Goedhart-van 
Alebeek, who gave me permission to make use of the archive of her late husband, and I want to thank the head 
of the Second Department of the Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA) in The Hague, Mr. E. van Laar, for his help 
during my visits to the ARA. My special thanks go to Mr. M. Baertl, a staff member of the ARA, who gave me 
ample advice and assistance. The unpublished Master's thesis, written by Jan Schenkman, "De Indonesie-reizen 
van Goedhart, alias Pieter't Hoen. Een land in Revolutie. Bevindingen en vertolking" (University of Nijmegen, 
1990), was very helpful to me, and I want to thank Prof. J. Bosnians at Nijmegen University for bringing this 
thesis to my notice. I am deeply in debt to Mr. Schenkman who gave me permission to make free use of the 
outcome of his research on Goedhart's travels to Indonesia in 1946,1947, and 1952. My thanks also go to Dr. M. 
Campfens of the International Institute for Social History (IISG) in Amsterdam, who helped open the archives 
for my research as quickly as possible. Finally, I wish to thank Prof. Dr. H. Daalder, Dr. C. Touwen-Bouwsma, 
W. ten Have, D. Barnouw, M Baertl, J. Schenkman, Dr. L. Blusse, and Mrs. M.A.A.W. Goedhart-van Alebeek for 
their critical comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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The unexpected manner in which the Labor Party dealt with the Dutch postwar colonial 
legacy has been generally explained to date in terms of unfavorable political pressure from 
its conservative government partner.1 In the parliamentary elections of May 1946, both the 
Labor Party and the Roman Catholic Party were winners, but, as neither party got a major­
ity, a coalition cabinet had to be formed. A more or less progressive social and economic po­
litical program of reconstruction and renewal was agreed upon, imperative for a country 
that was devastated and greatly impoverished after five years of German occupation. In 
order to enhance the emancipation of the Dutch workers in the projected welfare state, the 
Labor Party had to cooperate with a partner which harbored fundamentally different views 
about decolonization. Taking Dutch interests to heart, the leaders of the Catholic Party were 
not willing to allow any concessions to Indonesian nationalism at all, an opinion to which 
the other confessional parties and the liberals fully subscribed. Yet, it was this coalition gov­
ernment that had to deal with the aspirations of the Indonesian nationalists and the reality 
of the existence of the Indonesian Republic.
The political strains which caused the Labor Party to follow a highly moderate and, in 
the end, even anti-Republic policy have been the subject of much research elsewhere.2 By 
emphasizing the party's problematic position almost exclusively in terms of coalition poli­
tics, internal party political necessities, and exigencies posed by Dutch public opinion, 
studies of the issue have tended, however, to overlook the specific character of socialist 
anticolonialist ideology as a possible component of socialist embarrassment in the period 
during which the Netherlands tried to retain its colony. Based fundamentally on the same 
Eurocentric and colonial discourse permeating the entire Western civilization at the time, 
socialist anticolonialism could not offer an alternative analysis of the Indonesian nationalist 
and social revolution and its dynamics. The misconceptions and irritations about to emerge 
from this apparent lack of socialist analytical tools turned out to mesh strikingly with priori­
ties posed by the party's Catholic coalition partner and the need to conform to a public 
opinion that from 1945 onward was ardently anti-Republic.
The limitations of socialist anticolonialism are illustrated well by the dynamic decolo­
nization strategy of the socialist journalist and politician Frans Goedhart. In this essay, I in­
tend to bring into focus his specific political role as a middleman between the Netherlands 
and the Indonesian Republic during the first two years of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. 
Although a member of the small but authoritative group of socialists who ardently opposed 
the Labor Party's colonial policy, Goedhart had a conception of the decolonization process 
which, inspired as it was by a "mission civilisatrice" in socialist disguise, did not in fact 
deviate basically from the party's anticolonialist standpoint. For that reason, Goedhart's
1 F. van Baardewijk, "De PvdA van het koninkrijk 1945-1947," in Het tweede jaarboek voor het democratisch 
socialisme (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1980), pp. 164-212; J. Bank, "De PvdA en de Indonesische revolutie," 
in Socialisme en democratic 12 (1981): 585-93; J.Th J .  van den Berg, "Het miskende tijdvak: de eerste twintig jaar 
van de Partij van de Arbeid," in Het zevende jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme (Amsterdam: De Arbeiders­
pers, 1986), pp. 14-42; Harry Poeze, "De Indonesische kwestie in 1945-1950. Sociaal-demokratie in de klem," in 
Nederland, links en de koude oorlog: breuken en bruggen, ed. Joost Divendal, Arnold Koper et al. (Amsterdam: De 
Populier, 1982), pp. 38- 5^7.
2 Ibid. See also J. Bank, Katholieken en de Indonesische Revolutie (Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984) and L.
Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Of course, socialist commentators put 
forward this explanation with ardor during and after the crucial period. See, e.g., J. de Kadt, "'Rampspoed 
geboren.' Rondom de 20ste juli 1947," in J. de Kadt, De deftigheid in het gedrang. Ben keuze uit zijn verspreide 
geschriften, ed. M.C. Brands, R. Havenaar and B.A.G.M. Tromp (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1991), pp. 288-309; 
and J. de Kadt, De Indonesische tragedie. Het treurspel der gemiste kansen (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 1949).
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partly self-assumed mediatory mission in behalf of the Dutch Labor Party simply had to 
fail. His role as a middleman clearly displays the limits to socialist anticolonialism.
Although in most publications about this period of Dutch decolonization, reference is 
made to both Goedhart's criticism of the Labor Party's politics and his service as the party's 
delegate to the Indonesian socialist parties in the summer of 1947, a more balanced assess­
ment of his remarkable political role can now been made thanks to the new archival mate­
rial that has recently become accessible to scholarly research.3 In the following, I will first 
briefly survey the biographical background of this self-willed journalist and politician and 
appraise the nature of his political approach to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. Subsequently, 
after an inquiry into the contents of his socialist anticolonialism, Goedhart's political 
achievements in the period 1945-1947 will be considered. By this biographical method I 
intend to enhance an understanding of the fundamental ambiguities of socialist anticolo­
nialism.
A Middleman
In the crisis-ridden decade preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, Frans 
Goedhart (1904-1990) had to struggle hard to earn a decent living as a journalist. In the early 
1930s, he was employed by the Dutch Communist daily, the Tribune. He turned out to be 
not only a socially and politically engaged reporter but a devoted member of the party as 
well. After a couple of years, however, he could no longer support the party's policy. Its 
slavish obedience to Moscow's directions seemed to Goedhart harmful to the antifascist 
struggle. A short period of intraparty opposition followed, and in 1934 he was finally ex­
pelled. Briefly active in one of the other small radical leftist parties flourishing in the 
Netherlands in the mid-1930s, he gradually became sympathetic toward social democracy, 
although never joining the ranks of the Dutch Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP).
At the end of the decade, Goedhart was a freelance journalist writing for a Belgian so­
cialist daily. When the Germans invaded the Netherlands in May 1940, he did not flee the 
country. Three months later, he brought out the forerunner of the resistance paper Het 
Parool, to be published from 1941 until the liberation. In 1945, as a logical outcome of his 
prewar and wartime political and journalistic career, Goedhart sought to combine both 
careers once again, inseparable as they were in his opinion. In the first postwar months, he 
was the deputy editor-in-chief of the daily Het Parool. From August 1945 on, he headed the 
foreign policy section of this independent socialist paper, which, under one of Goedhart's 
most capable wartime co-editors, was soon held in high regard. At the same time, his 
prominence as a resistance hero brought Goedhart to the temporary Parliament that func­
tioned until the first postwar elections, held in May 1946. Although a prominent member of 
the new Dutch Labor Party, he was not chosen for the new Parliament. In September 1946, 
however, when the new government sent the Laborite W. Schermerhom to Batavia as
3 In 1991 Goedhart's personal archive was transferred to the Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA) in The Hague. 
Reference to Goedhart's political role in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict has been made among others by Van 
Baardewijk, "De PvdA van het koninkrijk 1945-1947"; Bank, Katholieken en de Indonesische Revolutie; Poeze, "De 
Indonesische kwestie in 1945-1950"; M.P. van der Vusse, "De Partij van de Arbeid, Nederland en de Indone­
sische Revolutie," Master's thesis, RUU, 1984; S.L. van der Wal, P.J. Drooglever, and M.J.B. Schouten, O fftake 
bescheidert betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1945-1950, vols. V, VI, and IX. (The Hague: 
Staatsuitgeverij, 1975,1976, and 1981).
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chairman of the Commissie-Generaal, the Commission General that had to negotiate with the 
Indonesian Republic, Goedhart replaced him in the Second Chamber.4
The Dutch Labor Party was founded in February 1946, replacing the prewar Social 
Democratic Workers' Party. The new Partij van de Arbeid was, in composition, an amalga­
mation of non-Communist progressives. Although social democrats formed the majority of 
the new party's members, a number of Catholics and Protestants joined it as well. This was 
a new phenomenon in Dutch politics. In prewar times, due to the strong religious division 
of Dutch society, diverse population groups had founded their own religion-based political 
parties and cultural and educational organizations.5 The new Labor Party, now trying to en­
compass not only the workers but middle-class people as well, aspired to cut through the 
traditional lines of class and religion by offering a non-Marxist progressive political pro­
gram. The diverse membership of the new Labor Party after February 1946 clearly influ­
enced the party's outlook. In order to accommodate the different political viewpoints and to 
keep the party together, the leadership took pains to avoid extreme positions. This strategy 
motivated its attitude toward Indonesian nationalism as well.6
Goedhart had been strongly in favor of the founding of the new Labor Party. Before the 
war he had shared the more generally held view that Dutch government and society were 
completely corrupted by the economic and political crisis. In his opinion, the old, rigid, and 
ineffective government needed reorganization and rejuvenation. A new Labor Party should 
take the lead in the ensuing radical socialist reconstruction of government and society. Dur­
ing the war these ideas were ardently put forward in Het Parool. At the founding congress of 
the Labor Party, Goedhart spoke on behalf of a group of formerly independent socialists 
who had joined the new party and told his audience that the new party had to follow a rad­
ical socialist course. Pivotal in its policies should be the reorganization of the colonial rela­
tionship between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies.7
In the following years, Goedhart took it upon himself to become a middleman between 
the Netherlands and the Indonesian nationalists. In his opinion, the controversy needed to 
be brought to an end as soon as possible, not only for the benefit of the latter but for that of 
the Dutch as well. He attempted to bridge the gap between the two struggling parties and to 
provide highly valuable informal means of access by which the opponents could try to ob­
tain their ends.8 With that aim in mind, he was quick to exploit his position as politician and 
journalist. Due to his unique status as the founder of Het Parool, he enjoyed nearly complete 
freedom to inspire his readers with more understanding of what was at stake in Indonesia. 
In Parliament, the Indonesian national revolution found in him one of its most sympathetic
4 The Dutch national legislature is called the States General. It is a bicameral legislative body. The Second Cham­
ber is the lower house. It consisted at that time of 100 members. The First Chamber is the upper house, and had a 
membership of 50. The Second Chamber is directly elected; the First Chamber is elected indirectly via the 
provincial legislatures.
5 For this characteristic of Dutch political life, see A. Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and 
Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
6 J. Bank, "De PvdA en de Indonesische revolutie," p. 585.
7 M. de Keizer, "'De Partij van de Arbeid. Een Parool-ideaal wordt werkelijkheid': Het Parool en de Partij van de 
Arbeid," in Het zesde jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme, ed. J. Bank, P. Kalma, M. Ros, and B. Tromp 
(Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1985), p. 100.
8 Cf. Schenkman, "De Indonesie-reizen van Goedhart," p. 14-15.1 derive the description of the middleman's 
activities from Audrey R. Kahin, "Brokers and Middlemen in Indonesian History: a Review," p. 137, in Indonesia 
36 (October 1983): 135-42. To be effective, she writes, the middleman must also be involved with and central to 
the process of interaction. This, too, was the case with Goedhart's mediating role.
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and capable spokesmen. In Indonesia, nationalists held him in high esteem because of the 
balanced view he had presented of the future of the colony in Het Parool during the war and 
because of the positive analyses of the Indonesian revolution that he published after libera­
tion.
Goedhart's independent socialist viewpoints and the outspoken way in which he usu­
ally delivered his opinion were not well received by everyone in the party. The party lead­
ership loathed the individualism of this famous former resistance worker who could freely 
publish his opinions in a socialist daily that competed with the party's own paper. But at the 
same time it respected Goedhart's loyal nonconformity, which facilitated his mediating ac­
tivity and served the leadership's objective of keeping the party together and securing its 
position in government.9 In allowing Goedhart to play a minor role in its Indonesian policy, 
the party leaders successfully accommodated those members who severely criticized the 
way they and the Laborite ministers in the cabinet were dealing with the Indonesian nation­
alists. Goedhart, on the other hand, employed this special position not only to the benefit of 
the Indonesian nationalist cause as he perceived it, but also to exert a radicalizing influence 
on the party leadership and its policies in general. In his opinion, the Labor Party was fun­
damentally failing in its purpose of radically renewing government and society after the 
war.
In June 1947, the chairman of the Labor Party sent Goedhart to the Indonesian Republic 
in a last attempt to induce the Indonesian social democratic sister organizations to a more 
accommodating political course. By that time, the Labor Party's complicity in the launching 
of a military action against the Indonesian Republic appeared unavoidable. For Goedhart 
grasping the chance to be an agent of history, this mission turned out to be a climactic ex­
perience in the policy of socialist decolonization.
Goedhart's Socialist Anticolonialism
Goedhart's view on the future of the Dutch East Indies combined elements of the social 
democratic anticolonial program of the 1930s, vaguely tainted by contemporary left-wing 
socialist viewpoints on the matter, with a highly nonlegalistic, nonconformist response to 
the Indonesian reality of 1945. To help the Indonesian people gain their freedom was, 
according to him, one of the tasks the radical socialist Resistance had pledged to fulfill.
The colonial program of the Social Democratic Workers' Party dated from 1932. It had 
been formulated after a serious party crisis that had its origin in the party left-wing's oppo­
sition to the general reformist party line taking shape in the second half of the 1920s. The 
colonial question became an issue for the party because of the unrest in the Dutch East 
Indies at the time. "Indonesia, free from Holland now!" was the slogan of the opposition, 
that solicited the solidarity of the revolutionary socialist movements in the colonies as allies 
in the struggle against capitalism. At the party's Colonial Congress of 1930, the principles of 
its future colonial program were debated. In response to left-wing pressure, the statement 
that social democracy unconditionally recognized the right of national independence re­
placed support for limited national independence. In 1932, however, the left-wing split from 
the party. No longer harassed by radical anticolonial slogans, the party congress later that 
year unanimously approved a new colonial program stating that the eventual independence 
of Indonesia had to be advanced by evolutionary and peaceful decolonization. The party's
9 All cabinets in the Netherlands have been coalition cabinets, necessitated by the Dutch multiparty system.
Until 1958, they all had a Catholic-socialist coalition as their main foundation. The Catholic Party and the Labor 
Party each controlled about a third of the seats in the States General.
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new economic program of 1935 contained proposals for reforming the economic structure of 
the Dutch East Indies to meet the colony's own needs.10
Despite the fact that it now recognized the colony's right to independence, the social 
democratic political and economic program of the 1930s basically elaborated viewpoints 
held since the turn of the century embodied in the so-called Ethical Policy or "mission civili- 
satrice." Although the abortive Communist revolts of 1926-1927 in the Dutch East Indies 
had terminated this policy, elements of the strategy remained in the social democratic colo­
nial program of 1932-35,11 which strongly focused on improving the colony's economic 
infrastructure. Once the regional economy was immune to world exploitation and a non- 
Communist nationalist movement able to support itself, Indonesia would be, according to 
the social democratic scenario, ready to be politically independent as well. The program 
shrank from setting a timetable for abolishing metropolitan dominance, as it was realized 
that this political strategy for the time being served the economic interests of the crisis- 
ridden metropolitan working class well. This Realpolitik clearly illustrates the interdepen­
dency of the lofty social democratic decolonization ideals and the earthly needs of the Dutch 
working classes.
Moreover, the social democrats were well aware of the fundamental disagreements be­
tween themselves and the colonial nationalists:
The Dutch social democrats seek an alternative productive mode and oppose capitalism 
because it is capitalism. The nationalists oppose the same enemy but with an entirely 
different viewpoint. For them the enemy represents the national oppressor. Both thus 
stand on common territory against a common enemy, but each has its own goal.12
This statement by one of the party's spokesmen on the Colonial Congress, encapsulated the 
future socialist anticolonialist dilemmas. More explicitly, the socialists claimed to support 
the nationalist struggle with those means which they themselves considered most effective: 
"We have our own vision."13
Although during World War II the colonial position of the Netherlands had been subject 
to much debate among the Dutch both in and outside the Resistance, and in the exile gov­
ernment in London as well, no essentially new viewpoints on the matter emerged. The dis­
cussion about the future status of the Dutch East Indies was mostly inspired by Queen 
Wilhelmina's address on December 7,1942. Prompted by the growing resistance to colonial­
ism by the United States, the Netherlands' strong ally, she promised to hold a round table
10 E. Hansen, "The Dutch East Indies and the Reorientation of Dutch Social Democracy, 1939-1940," in Indonesia 
23 (April 1977): 59-85; P. van Tuyl, "Koloniale politiek in crisistijd; de SDAP en Indonesia, 1930-1935," in Het 
zevende jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1986), pp. 44-73.
11 Van Tuyl, "Koloniale Politiek," p. 70, disputes the viewpoint that the Social Democratic Worker's Party's 
program might be considered as a continuation of elements of the Ethical Policy, as asserted, among others, by 
Bank, "De PvdA en de Indonesische revolutie," and H.F. Cohen, Om de vernieuwing van het socialisme. De politieke 
orientatie van de Nederlandse sociaal-democratie 1919-1930 (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1974), p. 43. About 
the Ethical Policy, see E. B. Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in fragmenten. Vijf studies over koloniaal denken en doen van 
Nederlanders in de Indonesische Archipel 1877-1942 (Utrecht: Hes Uitgevers, 1981); and R. van Niel, The Emergence 
of the Modem Indonesian Elite (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).
12 As dted in Hansen, "The Dutch East Indies," p. 74.
13 Ibid.
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conference after the war about the colony's future.14 The underground social democratic 
party's "colonial" commission met again in 1944 and decided in favor of continuing the 
relationship with Indonesia, although eventually as a sovereign and equal partner in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, thereby not transgressing the framework of the December 7, 
1942, speech.15
No new positions were taken in the program that the new Labor Party accepted in 1946. 
The party leadership, deeply shocked by the declaration of independence by Sukarno and 
Hatta in August 1945, and the Netherlands' gloomy economic situation, decided after some 
discussion in favor of an enduring relationship with an eventually self-governing Indonesia, 
instead of a future Commonwealth that Indonesia was free to join or not. Already in this 
embryonic stage, the projected Labor Party's leadership had to consider the less progressive 
standpoints of some of the prominent, but originally not social democratic, future partners 
within the new socialist party who were against independence for Indonesia at all.16
Although highly critical of the Netherlands' prewar rule over the Dutch East Indies, 
Goedhart had, during the war, upheld the view in Het Parool that maintaining the political, 
cultural, and economic bonds with Indonesia in the future would be to the benefit of both 
Indonesia and the Netherlands. Indonesia should remain within the constitutional set-up of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, eventually as a self-governing country.17 The point of 
view of Goedhart and Het Parool was basically congruent with that of the socialists during 
the war. In the fall of 1945, however, differences in mentality and approach arose between a 
leftist group in the party, which included Goedhart and the publicists Jacques de Kadt and 
Sal Tas, and the party leadership. De Kadt and Tas had both left the Social Democratic 
Workers' Party in 1932 in protest against its reformist position. Like Goedhart, they had 
moved toward social democracy after the mid-1930s. After the war, Tas became, again like 
Goedhart, a member of the party during its transitional phase into the new Labor Party. De 
Kadt, who had been in the Dutch East Indies during the war, returned to the Netherlands in 
March 1946, and immediately joined the new party. Only in 1948 did he get a seat in Par­
liament. De Kadt and Tas were both employed by Het Parool, which from 1945 began to 
express the group's opposition to the colonial policy of the Labor Party and the Dutch 
government.
Goedhart's ideas about the future of Indonesia changed almost immediately after 
Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia independent. His opinions were strongly influenced 
by the views De Kadt published as a correspondent of Het Parool. De Kadt lived at the time 
in Bandung, where he helped the Dutch left-wing socialist D.M.G. Koch edit the periodical 
Kritiek en Opbouw (Criticism and Construction). He greatly admired the social democrat 
Sjahrir, whom he had known since 1942. After the Japanese capitulation, De Kadt even 
aspired for a while to become Sjahrir's political adviser. Once he became prime minister, 
Sjahrir arranged that De Kadt could go safely to Batavia to start writing for Het Parool. At 
the same time, De Kadt started to publish articles in a public relations bulletin of the Repub-
14 C. Fasseur, "Een wissel op de toekomst: de rede van Koningin Wilhelmina op 6/7 december 1942," in Between 
People and Statistics. Essays on Modem Indonesian History: presented to P. Creutzberg, ed. F. van Anrooij et al. (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 267-80.
15 Van Baardewijk, "De PvdA van het koninkrijk 1945-1947," pp. 166-69.
16 Ibid., pp. 175-80.
17 M. de Keizer, Het Parool 1940-1945. Verzetsblad in Oorlogstijd (Amsterdam: Otto Cramwinckel, 1991), pp. 313- 
17.
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lie. He had ample opportunity to become well acquainted with both the Dutch government 
officials in Batavia and the Indonesian nationalists.18
On the whole, De Kadt took a fairly realistic position. Before the war, he had rejected 
colonialism, which he viewed as the ultimate form of capitalistic exploitation. He proposed 
in 1945 that the Netherlands, because of the attitude of the Western allies, should encourage 
the founding of an independent and democratic Indonesia. All that the Netherlands could 
hope for was some kind of alliance with its former colony. Holland should realize that it 
was a small country that had to consider the wishes of its allies, if only because at the time 
British troops were responsible for keeping law and order on Java.19 De Kadt never tired of 
pointing out the reasonableness and moderation of Sjahrir and his political friends. He 
argued that only Sjahrir would be capable of ending the chaotic situation in the fall of 1945, 
the Bersiap period, in which Indonesian revolutionaries tried to speed up the dynamics of 
the Indonesian revolution by robberies and murders. By leaving Sukarno out of his political 
analyses of the Republic's situation, De Kadt attempted to counter Dutch accusations that 
the Republic was a Japanese creation, governed by former collaborators with the Japanese, 
and therefore unacceptable as a partner in negotiations. De Kadt described Sjahrir's position 
during the Japanese occupation of the Dutch colony as analogous to the Dutch resistance. 
Yet he considered Sukarno not a collaborator but a fanatic and idle egoist, striving after 
domination. Hatta he assigned to a position between collaboration and resistance, who, 
forced as a well-known Indonesian nationalist to cooperate with the Japanese, had at the 
same time employed all his skills in the preparation of Indonesia's independence.20
Goedhart presented De Kadt's views to the temporary Parliament. In January 1946, in 
the parliamentary debate about the government's policy, he grasped the opportunity to 
speak about Indonesian affairs. By that time, Holland was deeply shocked by the gruesome 
deeds of the Indonesian pemuda (youth) during the past Bersiap period. Although Goedhart 
accused these young revolutionary extremists of being fascists, murderers, and robbers, he 
nevertheless marked the Dutch as the real culprits responsible for the chaos in Indonesia.
He displayed a realism that echoed that of De Kadt: "Whoever has the power and whoever 
is a rebel is defined by power relations and at present these are not very favorable for us.
We should act according to the consequences." The Dutch government had to understand 
that the current balance of power was against colonial rule and that colonialism and democ­
racy could not go together. In order to retain Indonesia, he concluded, paradoxically, politi­
cal ties with the country had to be cut. Thereafter, the Netherlands could profit economi­
cally from its relations with its former colony which would be in urgent need of the experi­
ence and capability of the Dutch to exploit its resources. For that reason military action 
against the Indonesian Republic, aimed at forcing it into a union with the Netherlands, 
should never be allowed.21 Goedhart clearly felt that a shrewd appeal to Dutch economic 
self-interest would be more convincing than arguments based on socialist anticolonialism, 
realism in international relations, or emotional sympathy with a people fighting for its 
freedom.
18 R. Havenaar, De tocht naar het onbekende. Het politieke denken van Jacques de Kadt (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 
1990), p. 159 and pp. 160—61; J. de Kadt, Jaren die dubbel telden. Politieke herinneringen (Amsterdam: Van Oorschot, 
1978), pp. 146-50.
19 J. de Kadt, De Indonesische tragedie, pp. 79-80; and Havenaar, De tocht naar het onbekende, p. 157.
20 J. de Kadt, "Open brief aan minister Logemann," in /, de Kadt, ed. M.C. Brands et al., pp. 274-87.
21 F.J. Goedhart in the Second Chamber, January 15,1946. Handelingen der Voorlopige Staten-Generaal, Tweede 
Kamer, 1945-1946, Verslag. (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1946), pp. 273-74.
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In the coining months Goedhart did his utmost to confront the overwhelming anti- 
Republican mood in the Netherlands by pointing out, time and again, that the Indonesians 
were not as anti-Dutch as they were alleged to be; that the nationalist movement and the 
Republic were not Japanese creations; nor was the situation on Java as bad as described in 
the heavily biased Dutch press. From January 1946, as a result of British mediation, the 
highest Dutch official in Batavia, Lieutenant Governor General H.J. van Mook, was working 
on an agreement with the nationalists. The prospects became so promising that in the latter 
half of April further talks took place with the Netherlands' government at Hoge Veluwe, 
near Arnhem. The government was, however, not willing to recognize the de jure sove­
reignty of the Republic over Java, nor did it agree with the Republic about its status in the 
interim period until sovereignty was transferred to Indonesia. It was clear, moreover, that 
the Dutch Parliament would never accept the proposals drafted in Batavia. In view of the 
coming Dutch elections in May, the government was unwilling to reach any agreement, 
and, consequently, the talks failed.22
A few weeks after the Hoge Veluwe talks and just before the elections were to be held, 
Parliament debated the report of the parliamentary commission that had been sent to Indo­
nesia to judge the situation. In these debates Goedhart strongly condemned the report. In 
his opinion, the commission had gathered evidence only from the high colonial administra­
tion and the colonial establishment, who felt doomed to lose their former power and privi­
leges and were thus resentful and bitter. It did not contribute in the least to the reconcilia­
tion of the Dutch with the Indonesian nationalists, nor was it a confirmation of the policy 
that had led to the ill-fated negotiations with the Republic at Hoge Veluwe. It was, on the 
contrary, a final attempt to obstruct any agreement at all.23
With this speech, Goedhart's first term in Parliament ended. The elections that month 
did not bring him back as a member of the new, first postwar Parliament. So he seized the 
opportunity to see for himself what the situation in Indonesia really was, and on June 15, 
1946, he took the airplane to Batavia. His intention was not only to speak with Dutch offi­
cials and members of the colonial establishment, as the parliamentary commission had 
apparently done, but to consult representatives of all political, social, and economic groups 
in the Dutch East Indies and, particularly, to visit the Indonesian Republic. In this phase of 
the conflict, he considered it crucial to refute the contents of the parliamentary report of 
May 1946. His aim was to redress the negative public opinion about the Indonesian 
nationalists.24 Het Parool sent him as the paper's special correspondent.
The First Dutch Journalist in Revolutionary Yogyakarta
Goedhart stayed nearly eight weeks on this his first visit to the country. Shortly after his 
arrival on June 15, he met Sjahrir, who had remained in Batavia while Sukarno and his 
ministers had gone to Yogyakarta. A week later, Goedhart informed his fellow party mem­
ber Schermerhom, whom he held in high esteem because of his role in the Resistance and 
his earlier moderate political stance, that Sjahrir was willing to resume negotiations. 
Republican Prime Minister Sjahrir proposed holding a conference in Cairo, because, after 
the failure of the one at Hoge Veluwe, Holland no longer seemed a suitable place. A month
22 J. van Goor, Indie/Indonesia. Van kolonie tot natie (Utrecht: Hes Uitgevers, 1987), p. 100.
23 F. J. Goedhart in the Second Chamber, May 6,1946. Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, p. 725.
24 F. J. Goedhart to A. Sweers, June 6,1946. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
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later, Schermerhom wrote Goedhart that he certainly approved of the idea, but no steps 
were taken to pursue it.25
From Batavia, Goedhart went to Malino, a hill station near Makassar in the Celebes, to 
attend the conference of representatives of East Indonesia. The conference, orchestrated by 
the Dutch, convened on July 16. After the isolation caused by the Japanese occupation, it 
offered the first opportunity to the participants to get acquainted with each other. Carefully 
selected by the Dutch, they appeared to favor Van Mook's plan for a future federal structure 
of Indonesia, which was proposed by him in part as a means to dilute the Republic's 
strength in an eventual independent Indonesia.
After attending the Malino conference, Goedhart visited Bali and traveled through Java. 
On August 17, he was welcomed as a special guest of the Indonesian Republic in Yogya- 
karta, the Republic's capital, to participate in the festivities commemorating the first anni­
versary of independence. Although he saw Sukarno occasionally, he was apparently not 
allowed to interview him. But he did speak with Hatta, Subandrio, Setiadjit, Sutomo, 
Darmasetiawan, and many other well-known nationalists during his fourteen-day sojourn 
in the Republic.26 With the prominent Republican journalist Rosihan Anwar he rode on a 
truck through Yogyakarta, while both stayed in the same hotel, the Merdeka.27 Back in 
Batavia, Goedhart had several talks with Van Mook.28 On August 13, he addressed the 
Dutch social democrats of the Progressive Group, which was convening in the Loge build­
ing in Batavia. On his journeys, he also met with Dutch planters and industrialists. In short, 
he tried to see and interview as many spokesmen or representatives of the political, social, 
and economic life of Indonesia as possible.
From July 19 onward, Goedhart published about nine articles in Het Parool about his 
experiences. Regarding his journalism as part of his political agenda, he was well aware of 
the potential impact of his articles. So he described the dynamics of the political and social 
revolution in Indonesia and the party struggle in the Republic in simple terms, stressing 
more the similarities than the differences in political ideas between the Dutch and the Indo­
nesian nationalists. He defended Sjahrir's “diplomasi" course and blamed the conservative 
colonial establishment in Batavia for the misunderstandings that contributed so strongly to 
its bad relationship with the Indonesian Republic. He wrote approvingly about Van Mook's 
federalist policy, citing the conference at Malino as a shining example of how "white and 
brown could go together." On August 19, he reported that the new Dutch prime minister's 
first statement, together with the ideas that the new minister of Overseas Territories ex­
pressed in an interview shortly thereafter, had been a great disappointment to the Indone­
sian nationalists. He was apparently appealing to the socialist ministers not to give in to the 
conservatives in the new Catholic-socialist coalition cabinet that had been installed earlier 
that month.29
25 F. J. Goedhart to W. Schermerhom, June 24,1946; W. Schermerhom to F.J. Goedhart, July 22,1946. Ibid.
26 See Goedhart's articles in this period and his booklet Terug uit Djokja (January 1947). Also F.J. Goedhart to 
Anak Agung gde Agung, March 22,1947; and F.J. Goedhart to A. Budiardjo, November 8,1946. ARAII, arch. 
Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
27 F. J. Goedhart to A. Budiardjo, November 8,1946. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
28 F. J. Goedhart to H.J. van Mook, September 18,1946. Ibid. They conferred with each other also about the 
founding of a progressive paper in Batavia.
29 See Het Parool, July 19,1946 ("Sjahrirs' Internal Problems" [transl.J; July 20,1946 ('The Purge of the Indonesian 
Opposition to Sjahrir" [transl.]); July 26,1946 ("The Colonial Establishment in Indonesia" [transl.J, August 9,
1946 ("The Great Lesson of Malino" [transl.J).
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In January 1947, nearly five months after his return to the Netherlands, Goedhart pub­
lished a booklet about his Indonesian journey, Terug uit Djokja (Back from Yogyakarta). The 
title and the design of its cover were strongly inspired by Andre Gide's Retour de VU.R.S.S., 
published after his visit to the Soviet Union in 1936. In this book Gide had shown great 
moral courage by publicly repudiating his former belief in communism as a means for com­
batting human alienation, which was the major theme of his literary works. Goedhart's 
rather obvious reference to Gide's book must have been deliberately inserted to alert the 
well-educated reader.30 Far from repudiating the Indonesian Republic, however, his book 
contained a highly positive account of the Indonesian Republic, systematically counter­
balancing Dutch prejudices and misunderstandings.
Terug uit Djokja was written in order to redress the growing Dutch alienation from the 
nationalists in Indonesia after the failure of the Hoge Veluwe talks. To reach a solution of 
the conflict, an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two opponents had to be created.
To that end, he stressed the positive aspects of the Indonesian struggle for independence. 
Goedhart argued, in short, that in the Republic three pivotal developments had taken place, 
all well worth being considered by the Dutch. First, it should be noted that Sjahrir, Hatta, 
and Sjarifuddin pursued a constructive policy that aimed at ending the excesses of revolu­
tionary violence. Second, it should be realized that Sukarno's popularity made him a politi­
cian whose signature could not be omitted from any eventual agreement with the Dutch. 
And finally, the Dutch had to understand that their policy toward a self-governing Indo­
nesia, encompassed in a lasting confederation with the Netherlands (in "Koninkrijks- 
verband"), was highly unrealistic in view of the Republic's deep distrust of Dutch 
intentions.31 Goedhart had in fact already reached this conclusion before his journey to 
Yogyakarta.
Goedhart's travels through Indonesia and the publication of his booklet evidently won 
him much goodwill. Among the nationalists, he was from now on known as "toean baik 
hati" ("the man with a good heart," the literal translation of Goedhart's name).32 Subandrio, 
whom he had met as an offical of the Republic's Department of Public Information, credited 
him with having brought about a whole mental revolution in Batavia. The Dutch finally 
seemed to understand that the Indonesian Republic could no longer be ignored.33 Goedhart 
received a letter from a Dutch woman in Batavia who wished him luck in fulfilling his 
cultural task of renewing and strengthening the bonds between the democratic part of the 
Netherlands and awakened Indonesia. Terug uit Djokja strongly compensated for all the bad
30 Goedhart finished the manuscript in October 1946. Only in January 1947 did he know the title. Terug uit Djokja 
was not an aggressive title but rather neutral, although not "pointless," he wrote to his editor. F J. Goedhart to 
A.J. Noordam, January 13,1947. ARA11, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
31 W.A. van Goudoever, chief of the Department of Political Reporting of the Dutch Information Service in 
Batavia, with whom Goedhart had had long conversations, sent a report of Goedhart's impressions to the 
government. Goedhart received a copy of this report as well. W. A. van Goudoever to F. J. Goedhart, September 
2,1946. ARA, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
32 R. Alwi to F. J. Goedhart, January 14,1947. Ibid. The Republican journalist Alwi featured in one of the 
chapters of Terug uit Djokja. F.J. Goedhart to R. Alwi, December 30,1946. Ibid. In 1946, Alwi was correspondent 
of Ra'jat Kedaulatan. A year later, he worked for Antara and Merdeku. Goedhart asked the editor-in-chief of Het 
Parool to appoint Alwi as Indonesian correspondent. This request was not honored. F. J. Goedhart to G. J. van 
Heuven Goedhart, December 2,1946. Ibid. In 1948, Alwi moved to Amsterdam where he got a job as a 
professional translator. He translated into English van Mook's book, Indonesia, Nederland en de wereld 
(Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 1949), among others.
33 Subandrio to F. J. Goedhart, October 17,1946. ARA II, arch. Goedhart corr. Indonesia.
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things she had heard about the Indonesian Republic.34 Van Mook recommended that 
Jonkman, the minister of Overseas Territories, read Goedhart's account of his Indonesian 
experiences. Trying hard at that time to reach an agreement with the Republic, Van Mook 
was impressed by Goedhart's announcement that the Republic's government was willing to 
cooperate with the Netherlands if only it were recognized first.35 Others in the colonial 
society, such as General Spoor, felt, however, that Goedhart was only subverting Dutch 
authority.36 Goedhart himself was rather disappointed about the impact of his report. He 
wrote to Schermerhom that, after the publication of Terug uit Djokja, he had received mostly 
disapproving letters. People simply did not want to believe that the Republic was not in 
complete chaos. Whoever opposed that view was usually regarded as "a traitor, a fascist or 
a bolshevik."37 Publication of a report by a Dutch delegation led by P.J. Koets, that, officially 
invited by the Republic's government, visited Yogyakarta in the third week of September, 
had an equally small impact on the Dutch mind. Presented to Jonkman a month later, this 
report generally confirmed Goedhart's views and stated that Sukarno, given his grip on the 
masses of the Indonesian people, held a strong political position in the Republic.38 But, as in 
the case of Goedhart's book, Koets' report was hardly noticed by the Dutch press.39 Perhaps 
Goedhart's tendency to overestimate the influence of political leadership and the impact of 
the written word led to his disappointment with the reception of his book's message. In­
stead of recognizing the slow force of change, he tended to explain his relative ineffective­
ness by accusing politicians and press of deliberate sabotage for selfish reasons.40
Back in Politics Again
The Labor Party's Indonesia Congress was scheduled to be held on September 7,1946. 
Goedhart felt that he could not miss this opportunity to propagate his own views. The day 
before the congress convened, he was back in the Netherlands. By that time, the party 
leadership must already have known that Goedhart would take Schermerhom's seat in 
Parliament after the official installation of the Commission General a few days later and, 
consequently, after its chairman's departure to Indonesia. Goedhart's opinion about Indo­
nesian affairs had to be reckoned with in the future. As a result, he was asked to deliver a 
short speech about his experiences in the Indonesian Republic.
The congress was led by the party's chairman Koos Vorrink, who was striving hard to 
reconcile as much as possible the members' differing views. After the opening address, the 
next speech was by L.N. Palar, an Indonesian and socialist member of Parliament. He fully 
agreed with the party's Indonesian policy, stressing that, although the party apparently 
wanted to keep a specific relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands, such a rela­
tionship could only be the outcome of a decision taken by Indonesia in all freedom and by 
mutual arrangement. With this policy, Palar stated, the party registered disagreement with
34 J.S.M. Brouwer-Blom to F. J. Goedhart, June 15,1947. Ibid.
35 H. J. van Mook to J. A. Jonkman, September 2,1946. In Van der Wal et al., Officiele bescheiden, 5:288-89. Cf. 
Schenkman, De Indonesie-reizen van Goedhart, p. 23.
36 Van der Wal, et al., Officiele bescheiden, 6:621-22. Cf. Schenkman, De Indonesie-reizen van Goedhart. p. 23.
37 F. J. Goedhart to W. Schermerhom, October 21,1946. ARA, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia.
38 Verslag van het bezoek van het gezelschap dr. P.J. Koets aan Republikeinsch gebied op Java, 15-20 September 1946 
[Report of the visit of the group of Dr. P.J. Koets to Republican territory on Java, September 15-20,1946] (The 
Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1946), pp. 1-5.
39 Goedhart to Soedjatmoko, September 30,1946. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia.
40 This evaluation of Goedhart's character is founded on my research about Goedhart's prewar and wartime 
political and journalistic carreer. De Keizer, Het Parool 1940-1945, chapter 1 and passim.
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the more conservative interpretations of Indonesia's future as outlined in Queen Wilhel- 
mina's December 1942 speech, according to which the eventually independent Indonesia 
would be obliged to assent to an association with the Netherlands in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands.41
Subsequently Logemann, the former minister of Overseas Territories, presented the 
party's current standpoint to the congress. He stated that, although the party recognized 
Indonesia's right to autonomy, the Dutch people preferred to maintain a certain political 
and socio-economic continuity with the past, to the benefit of both Indonesia and the 
Netherlands. After the Hoge Veluwe talks, however, the nationalists had grown so suspi­
cious of the Dutch intentions that they no longer "dared" [sic!] to continue their association 
with the Netherlands. It was, therefore, essential first to restore their confidence. Following 
this lofty presentation of socialist anticolonialist principles, Logemann quickly reverted to 
the usual colonial discourse, emphasizing that the Dutch still had a task to fulfill and inter­
ests to defend in Indonesia. The chaotic situation in the Indonesian Republic, the prob­
lematic existence of the Indonesian Republic next to the so-called Malino territories, the 
future of the Dutch in Indonesia, and Dutch economic interests all forced them to continue 
this task. The third part of Logemann's speech was devoted to the problem of whether the 
Dutch should be allowed to use military force if they failed to perform their task, either 
through their own fault or through that of the other side. He did not categorically reject the 
use of force, and only with regard to the federation policy pursued by the Dutch did he 
guarantee that, "if the Republic (or whatever party) did not want to stay associated with the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, no war would be waged by the Dutch." In conclusion, 
Logemann announced that the party was willing to negotiate with every delegate of the 
Republic, thereby changing its former line that the Dutch should never negotiate with the 
"collaborator" Sukarno. This change of view was possibly meant to be a concession to the 
more radical party members, in order to win their approval for the party's policy of sup­
porting the forthcoming dispatch of Dutch military forces to Indonesia. Logemann stressed 
that, in addition to furthering the aim of reaching an armistice with the Republic, their task 
was also to protect the security of the Dutch in Indonesia, as well as that of the Indonesians 
and the Chinese.42
Vorrink allowed Goedhart to take the floor after Logemann. Goedhart's brief and, ac­
cording to Het Parool, humorous account of his recent positive impressions in the Republic 
counteracted Logemann's more pessimistic views about the chaotic and dangerous situation 
on Java and Sumatra, without affecting the party's policy in any way.43 His amendment to 
the original resolution (prepared by the party's central committee), which stated the wil­
lingness of the Netherlands to do its utmost to help construct a modem democratic system 
in Indonesia in order to implement a socialist welfare program, received hardly any sup­
port.44 Goedhart, nevertheless, noticed that the delegates found his account astonishing 45
41 Verslag van het Congres-lndotiesie gehouden door de Partij van de Arbeid op 7 September 1946 [Report of the 
Indonesia Congress of the Dutch Labor Party, September 7,1946] (Amsterdam 1946), pp. 4-14.
42 Ibid., pp. 14-22.
43 Het Parool, September 11,1946.
44 Verslag van het Congres-lndonesie, pp. 23-24.
45 F. J. Goedhart to Subandrio, November 9,1946. ARAII, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
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But, according to Schermerhom, who attended the congress as well, Goedhart's optimism 
was not actually shared by the other delegates.46
On the whole, the delegates got the impression that the Labor Party was pursuing a 
principled and honest anticolonialist policy, trying to "preserve Indonesia and the Nether­
lands for each other," but never allowing the use of military force to impose an association 
with the Netherlands on Indonesia.47 Vorrink's closing speech only confirmed the delegates' 
idea about this crucial problem. He emphasized that under no circumstances would the 
Labor Party allow the use of military force. If negotiations with the Indonesian nationalists 
failed, international intervention had to be sought. He warned the delegates that the Labor 
Party occupied only 29 out of 100 seats in Parliament. Hence it was no use trying to over­
throw the government. This would be "unfair" to Indonesia, because the succeeding cabinet 
would, in that case, be more conservative. Leaving the cabinet seemed justified only if 
nothing further could be gained for Indonesia.48
In the forthcoming months, Goedhart seized every opportunity to give his opinion on 
Indonesian matters. His voice was heard in Parliament, where he retrieved his seat in Sep­
tember, and in Het Parool.49 In the party he could exert influence as a member of its central 
committee and of its Indonesia Commission, which was to advise the central committee 
about Dutch colonial affairs in general and about the Indonesian question in particular. He 
also promoted the Indonesian cause by his membership in the Dutch-Indonesian Society, 
the "Vereniging Nederland-Indonesie," a pressure group of mainly leftist intellectuals. 
Founded in late August 1945, this society aimed to bring "a new spirit of equality of rights 
and a lasting friendship between the peoples of both countries."50 Many socialists joined the 
Dutch-Indonesian Society, but it had no official ties with the Labor Party, whose leadership 
was quick to recognize that the society would eventually become a platform of opposition 
to its policy. From the fall of 1946, however, the party had to cope with a group of dissenters 
within its own ranks. By then some twenty party members formed the so-called Nova Zem- 
bla group,51 which intended to act as a pressure group in the party, stimulating implemen­
46 C. Smit, ed., Het dagboek van Schermerhom. Geheim verslag van prof. dr. ir. W. Schermerhom als voorzitter der 
commissie-generaal voor Nederlands-Indie, 20 September 1946 -7  October 1947 (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1970), 
pp. 2-3 [September 20,1946].
47 The press got this impression as well. In Het Parool, September 11,1946, the title of an article's paragraph 
about Logemann's speech was "No military force" [transl.].
48 Verslag van het Congres-Indonesie, pp. 30-31. The resolution that was passed at the end of the congress was: 
'The Congress, convinced that between the Netherlands and Indonesia no war can be waged and be allowed to 
be waged, and that the Netherlands is obliged to be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to the problems in 
Indonesia, believes: that it must strive after an association of state-units in Indonesia, equal in position, the one 
not subjected to the other in any way, in freedom affiliated as members of a community of nations, that the 
Netherlands must be willing to negotiate with representatives of the Indonesian Republic, in freedom selected, 
that as soon as possible an armistice must be concluded on conditions further defined by mutual arrangement, 
and that the despatch of military forces from the Netherlands must be arranged accordingly, that the unity of 
Indonesia must be maintained, safeguarding the Indonesians and the non-Indonesian minorities, that 
appropriate measures must be devised for those who have been expelled from their property and means of 
existence." Ibid., pp. 31-32.
4  ^The significance of this outlet for Goedhart is underlined by the fact that the socialist daily Het Vrije Volk had 
written nothing about the press conference that Goedhart gave after his journey. F. J. Goedhart to K. Voskuil, the 
editor-in-chief of Het Vrije Volk, September 12,1946. ARA, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
50 Cited in Van Baardewijk, "De PvdA van het koninkrijk 1945-1947," p. 170.
51 The name of the group referred to that of the group's chairman, J. Barents. In the 1590s the explorer J. Barents, 
trying to reach India by the northern route, spent one winter on the island Nova Zembla.
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tation of a "new socialism" regarding current problems.52 The group soon became a center 
of opposition to the party's Indonesia policy, with men like Goedhart, De Kadt, and Tas as 
prominent spokesmen.
On December 17,1946, Goedhart addressed Parliament. In the preceding month, the 
Commission General in Batavia had reached an agreement with the Indonesian Republic. 
Following the signing of an armistice in October 1946, political talks had begun between the 
two sides. In mid-November an informal agreement was reached, and a first draft of an 
accord was initialed by the negotiators in the Javanese mountain resort of Linggajati. In 
December, the Second Chamber of Parliament discussed the draft. Goedhart pointed out in 
his speech that the now seemingly imminent independence of Indonesia was simply a ques­
tion of "historical justice." A nation with a population of 9 million people could simply no 
longer rule over a country of 75 million people. At present, he saw a great change in the 
balance of power that could be curbed "neither by an appeal to the Dutch constitution, nor 
with reference to former Dutch achievements in Indonesia, nor by manifestations of anger, 
unwillingness, and irritation, nor by the use of military force." He praised the Commission 
General and Van Mook for reaching this agreement, which in his opinion should be carried 
by vote.53
In order to get the accord accepted by a majority in the divided Second Chamber, and 
thus to retain the Catholic-socialist coalition government, a motion was presented in which 
approval of the agreement was made dependent on new conditions to which the Indonesian 
Republic was to assent. When this motion was put to the vote, the socialists, Goedhart in­
cluded, voted for it. As a result the government was induced to resume its negotiations with 
the Indonesian Republic, that by that time felt deeply humiliated by the unilateral amend­
ment of the original document by the Dutch.
Goedhart's view of the future was not shared by most of his colleagues in Parliament, 
nor even by the majority of Labor Party members. In the Congress that convened in May 
1947 Goedhart was not reelected to the new party's central committee.54 Regarding him as a 
too valuable a member to be that easily discarded, the party's central committee, however, 
elected him as its consultative member.
Meanwhile, Goedhart had tried to get in touch with people in Indonesia in order to keep 
well informed about current affairs there. He started to correspond with all the people he 
had met during his stay there who were willing to respond to his letters. Soon he was carry­
ing on a lively correspondence with J. de Graaff, the chairman of the Dutch Progressive 
Group in Batavia, and with Koch, the group's representative in Bandung. There was fre­
quent correspondence with Schermerhorn, now in Batavia as chairman of the Commission 
General. Subandrio, who had become Secretary General of the Republic's Information Ser­
vice, and his wife became Goedhart's intimate friends. Only two days after his return to the 
Netherlands, Goedhart sent his first letter to Subandrio 55 In October, however, it turned out
52 J. Barents to fellow party members, October 10,1946. IISG, coll. Barents, 175.
53 Hattddingen der Staten-Generaal, 1946-1947, pp. 911-15.
54 F. J. Goedhart to W. Schermerhorn, May 6,1947. ARAII, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia.
55 While still in Indonesia, Goedhart agreed to send Subandrio regularly books he asked for. From the start, 
however, this project failed. Although Goedhart sent some books, he received neither any payment from 
Subandrio nor any answer to his letters. Eventually it appeared that the whole correspondence had been 
confiscated by the Dutch authorities in Batavia. The confiscated letters are in ARA II, Algemene Secretaire en de 
daarbij gedeponeerde archieven 1942-1950, no. 5457. The correspondence with Subandrio had its ups and 
downs, but was continued until August 1953.
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that Subandrio had shown one of Goedhart's letters to Schermerhom, who, after reading its 
contents, felt rather alarmed and advised Goedhart to observe more prudence in providing 
information to the Indonesians. Goedhart, for his part, reprimanded Subandrio for having 
told others about the contents of his letters.56
From 1946 to 1953 through his correspondence with many leading Indonesians, 
Goedhart managed to create a network of valuable informants that formed the basis of his 
forthcoming mediating role.57
A Fair Deal
In March 1947 the Linggadjati Agreement was passed by the Parliament of the Indone­
sian Republic. The armistice provided there, however, was often violated. The Republic was 
not willing to conform to the subordinate and dependent position assigned to it during the 
projected interim period of Dutch rule, exercised until the union in which it would partici­
pate, became effective in 1949. Nor did it accept the presence of a Dutch-Indonesian military 
force to maintain law and order in the Republic's territories. On the other hand, the financial 
difficulties of the Dutch government necessitated their reaching a quick solution to the con­
flict. Maintaining a considerable military force in Indonesia, while not receiving any reve­
nues from most of the colony, threatened to empty the Dutch treasury. In May, Van Mook 
tried to overcome the deadlock in the negotiations by asking the Republic to consent to the 
proposed federalist form of government. It was clear that, if the Republic was not willing to 
conform, Dutch military action against the Republic to force it to accept the Dutch view of 
the Linggadjati Agreement could hardly be averted.
The growing bellicose mood in the Netherlands induced Goedhart to appeal to Sjahrir. 
He wrote him a letter, calling attention to the extremely difficult position of the Labor Party 
if the negotiations in Batavia were to fail again. A politically weakened Labor Party would 
be very disadvantageous to the Republic. People like Schermerhom and Van Mook would 
be replaced by more conservative politicians, with all the ensuing consequences.58 This 
letter was apparently meant to start a more regular correspondence between Goedhart and 
Sjahrir at this crucial moment. Just a fortnight after his first letter, Goedhart sent a second 
one, on June 4,1947. Subandrio and Setiadjit had asked Goedhart to write again, it said. He 
proposed that he and Sjahrir have a frequent and "completely confidential" exchange of 
ideas. He sent further letters to Sjahrir on June 5,12, and 13.59 In the last one, Goedhart 
informed Sjahrir that the Labor Party's central committee had decided to send him to Indo­
nesia in order to inform Sjahrir about the present situation of the Dutch-Indonesian negotia­
tions, to enlighten him extensively about the political situation in the Netherlands, and to 
consult with him about a socialist initiative to end the present impasse.60 That same day, 
phrasing the aim of his mission in somewhat different words, Goedhart announced the 
news in letters to Van Mook and Schermerhom as well.61
56 W. Schermerhom to F.J. Goedhart, October 11,1946. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesie.
57 Cf. Schenkman, De Indonesie-reizen van Goedhart, p. 29. (Letters were sent to and often answered by Sjahrir, 
Sukarno, Palar (after 1947), Hadji Agus Salim, Anak Agung gde Agung, Darsono, Soedjatmoko, and 
Darmasetiawan, among others. In 1953, Goedhart's relations with Indonesia had changed so radically that 
almost all his correspondence with Indonesians had stopped.)
58 F. J. Goedhart to S. Sjahrir, May 21,1947. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesie.
59 Ibid.
60 F. J. Goedhart to S. Sjahrir, June 13,1947. Ibid.
61 F. J. Goedhart to H. J. van Mook, June 13,1947; F.J. Goedhart to W. Schermerhom, June 13,1947. Ibid.
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Sending Goedhart to Indonesia was part of a skillful plan by the party's chairman, 
Vorrink. On June 11, the party's central committee, the socialist members of Parliament, and 
the party's Indonesia Commission had met, and discussed the rather evasive answer the 
Republic had given to Van Mook's question regarding a federal form of government. It was 
agreed that this reply should not be seen as a provocation to military action. On the next 
day, it appeared that the Commission General was internally divided about how to react to 
the Republic's response, some favoring advising the Dutch government for and others 
against military action. In order to avoid a Labor Party split over this problem at the forth­
coming party council on June 14, which would result in the fall of the cabinet, the five 
Laborites directly responsible for the party's Indonesia policy drew up a draft resolution. 
The day before the party council's gathering, Vorrink went to see Goedhart, to inform him 
of the contents of this resolution. In order to win support, Vorrink proposed that Goedhart 
travel to Indonesia as the party's delegate in an attempt to alert the Republic to the critical 
situation. If Goedhart was willing to go, he had to be loyal to the party line to be set at the 
coming party council. Also, he had to keep in close contact with Schermerhom and Van 
Mook during his stay in Indonesia.62
At the party council, Goedhart, backed by other radical party members, succeeded in 
canceling the paragraph in the resolution's draft that approved military action if the 
situation turned out to be "intolerable." After consultation with Drees and at the urgent 
request of Vorrink he withdrew two other amendments to the resolution. Thereupon the 
party council unanimously passed the resolution.63
Once again Vorrink had succeeded in keeping the party together. By allowing Goedhart 
to go to Indonesia, he had brought this troublesome party member, whose opposition and 
that of his political friends Vorrink apparently had feared, to conform to the policy of the 
party leadership.64 The confidential mission of this well-known friend of Indonesia seemed 
highly opportune to Vorrink, as a manifestation of the Labor Party's goodwill toward the 
Republic. A few weeks earlier, Vorrink had considered going himself, but, in view of the 
worsening situation, he decided to stay in Holland.65 If Goedhart had any success, this 
would be highly profitable to the party; if not, no harm would be done. Goedhart was, of 
course, only a delegate or courier of the party and was in no position at all to influence the 
outcome of the negotiations in Batavia.
But Goedhart also had his own hidden agenda. Now that he and his political friends 
had capitalized on their opposition in the last few months and his political influence had
62 J. J. Vorrink to W. Schermerhom, June 16,1947. Van der Wal, Officiele bescheiden, 9:348-53. See also: Verslag 
van de Partijraad [Report of the Party Council], June 14,1947. IISG, Arch. PvdA, PR 1947.
63 Ibid. See also: Verslag van de Partijraad, June 14,1947. Ibid.
64 Cf. Schenkman, De Indonesie-reizen van Goedhart, p. 30. In his letter to Schermerhom (see note 62) Vorrink 
wrote that his visit was highly appreciated by Goedhart and his political friends and that by this strategy he had 
avoided the problem that the party council, following the instigation of the party's opposition, would succeed in 
reversing the party's projected policy.
Hearing about Goedhart's mission to Indonesia in a phone call with Logemann on June 13,1947, 
Schermerhom wrote in his diary that the party, by sending Goedhart, would be stronger than without this 
gesture to the left wing. Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, p. 617 [June 13,1947].
65 The idea of going himself to Indonesia was already being considered in April. By that time Vorrink gave three 
reasons why it would be sensible to go: 1. The Labor Party itself could show its concern about the situation in 
Indonesia; 2. the party could meet party members in Indonesia; 3. such a visit would give publicity to the party. 
Party executive's minutes, April 17,1947 and minutes of the party's central committee, April 21,1947.11SG, arch. 
PvdA, 1947.
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grown markedly, he felt he was in the right position to mediate in the Dutch-Indonesian 
conflict. He too had nothing to lose. If he succeeded in bringing the opponents together, he 
would serve both the Indonesian cause and his own political position. If not, nothing would 
have changed.
Vorrink expected Goedhart to do no more than explain the extremely painful position of 
the Dutch Labor Party to the Indonesian socialists, with the hope of persuading them to 
make concessions. To that end, Goedhart had to deliver a letter to the Indonesian socialist 
parties, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia, the Partai Buruh Indonesia, and the "Partai Pemuda 
Sosialis Indonesia" (i.e, the Indonesian Socialist Youth, the Pesindo, which was not a party, 
but a semi-military organization formed by the merger of a number of youth groups). In 
this letter, Vorrink stated that the socialist movement in the Netherlands had always been a 
strong opponent of colonialism and consequently the Dutch Labor Party sympathized with 
the Indonesian nationalist movement. However, it could not, "given the Dutch situation," 
support the current Indonesian view on the procedure for transferring sovereignty to the 
colony. It was the duty of the Dutch Labor Party to implement the Linggadjati Agreement, 
which it did not consider an onerous task. On the contrary, the party envisaged it, in 
Vorrink's grandiose statement, "as a matter of honor to prove in the face of the history of 
mankind that a peaceful liquidation of colonial relations was possible." Socialism meant 
justice and wisdom. The Dutch Labor Party promised to defend both and asked its 
Indonesian counterpart to do the same.66
If Vorrink had thought that the party's delegate would proceed quietly and diplomati­
cally, he was soon disenchanted by the first accounts of Goedhart's activities in Batavia. In 
part, the endless misunderstandings and problems rising between them in the forthcoming 
weeks had their origin in the vague arrangements made before Goedhart's departure. But 
the main reason was that, while Vorrink certainly had a clear idea of the mission's purpose, 
Goedhart himself had his own interpretation of Vorrink's intentions, witness his letter to 
Sjahrir dated June 13, cited above. Moreover, asking for a distinct mandate suited neither 
Goedhart's character nor his political scheme. Vorrink should have known that Goedhart 
would never be willing to obey orders from anyone. This had been the cause of the flaming 
row they had had in 1941, when they were co-editors of the Resistance paper Het Parool. 
Now that at long last he was presented with the opportunity to mediate in the Dutch-Indo­
nesian conflict, Goedhart certainly did not want his freedom to be limited by any directive. 
Consequently, Vorrink's master plan seemed doomed to fail.
The Party's Delegate
On June 22,1947, Goedhart arrived in Indonesia. That same day, he spoke with Scher- 
merhom in Batavia. The following day he was received by Sjahrir, the chairman of the PSI, 
to whom he delivered Vorrink's letter. In the first week of July, he met Sukarno, giving the 
Republican president some books as a gift. From June 28 on, Goedhart regularly reported 
his thoughts and actions to Vorrink in written accounts and telegrams.67
66 "Partij van de Arbeid richt zich tot Indonesische socialisten" [The Dutch Labor Party appeals to the 
Indonesian socialists]. Vorrink published the main points of the letter of June 17,1947, in his article in Het Vrije 
Volk, June 18,1947. It should be noted that, according to this, Goedhart was sent to carry out a "courier service" 
for the party. The full text of the letter was published in a leaflet, brought out by the Progressive Group in 
Batavia, June 22,1947. ARAII, arch. Goedhart, Indonesia.
67 Goedhart sent ten telegrams and seven written accounts to Vorrink between June 28 and July 18,1947. ARA II, 
arch. Goedhart, Indonesia [the originals] and IISG, arch. PvdA, 1947, com. 2, portfolio 25 [mimeographs].
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Almost immediately after receiving the first of these reports, Vorrink realized that the 
party's delegate was showing too much initiative, more than he was prepared to take re­
sponsibility for. Clearly, there needed to be a definite agreement reached regarding what 
Goedhart was supposed to accomplish in Indonesia. Vorrink sent Goedhart a letter instruct­
ing him that he had to consider his mission as a political-diplomatic assignment. This meant 
that only after consultation with Vorrink or Schermerhom (who was a member of the 
party's central committee) was Goedhart allowed to give a statement to the press. Any pro­
jected publication should go via the general press agencies or should be published exclu­
sively by Het Vrije Volk and Het Parool. Vorrink, however, strongly preferred "internal 
information, internal discussion and forming of opinion, and internal, very discreet inter­
vention" over any publicity whatever. His letter ended with fatherly advice:
You should listen when I tell you that not everything can be solved with "dynamics".
Dynamics can become rashness, destroying on the one hand whatever is created by the
other. This is the reason why your public political performance risks failure.68
As it turned out, in his talks with the leaders of the PSI, PBI, and Pesindo, according to the 
Indonesian papers, Goedhart had referred to strictly confidential internal party politics. In 
the Netherlands, this caused some commotion, which was highly inopportune for the Labor 
Party. Nor was Goedhart's diplomatic gift of books to Sukarno widely applauded. Goedhart 
had presented these explicity on behalf of the Labor Party. At home, this was immediately 
denied by the party. Most of all, Vorrink was annoyed by Goedhart's making use of Het 
Parool as his exclusive publicity medium. The day after Vorrink received Goedhart's first 
important telegram, copies of which Vorrink personally gave to the prime minister, the six 
Laborite ministers, and three other directly concerned party leaders, its text was published 
in Het Parool.69
Goedhart's gift of books to Sukarno is a fair example of his specific interpretation of the 
party's assignment. In order to fulfill his mission loyally and to get the most out of it, he felt 
it necessary to free himself from the Labor Party's legalistic strategy and frame of mind. In 
carrying out his "goodwill mission," he wrote to the party, it seemed only wise to offer 
Sukarno the books on behalf of the party and not as. a personal gift. Goedhart cynically 
reminded his readers that, after all, Sukarno was the president of the Indonesian Republic, 
which was recognized de facto by the Dutch government and was also the other party in the 
Linggadjati Agreement. His gesture had to be considered as a demonstration of the party's 
goodwill, and was indeed regarded as such by the Indonesians, including the Indonesian 
press.70
Goedhart's statement to the Indonesian press ("In the name of the Dutch Labor Party") 
should be regarded as another manifestation of his attempt to strengthen confidence in the 
party among both Indonesians and Dutch in Indonesia. The letter was written after he had 
found that Vorrink's well-written diplomatic letter had been badly received by the Indo­
nesian socialist leaders.71 The style and composition of the very outspoken statement were
68 J. J. Vorrink to FJ. Goedhart, July 5,1947. ARAII, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
69 Ibid.
70 F. J. Goedhart to "Dear friends and party members," July 16,1947. Among the books Goedhart gave as a 
present were those of prominent party members such as M. van der Goes van Naters, J. W. Hofstra, and J. 
Tinbergen, in addition to his own Terug uit Djokja.
71 Goedhart told Schermerhom about the meetings of the PSI, PBI, and Pesindo he had attended. Schermerhom 
felt that Vorrink's letter, although more impressive than the party's ambivalent resolution of June 14,1947, had
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typical of Goedhart. His intention was to restore nationalist confidence in the party's wil­
lingness to reach a peaceful agreement, while at the same time asking the Indonesians to 
adjust to the complex situation of the party in accomplishing this. In no way, however, did 
the letter deviate from the party's line.72
Again, Vorrink was neither pleased by Goedhart's interpretation of his letter nor much 
amused by the reports of his delegate's accomplishments. The decision to send Goedhart to 
Indonesia had been hastily made by only a few party leaders, while the party's central 
committee was not even consulted. As long as everything went well this posed no prob­
lems, but members of the party's central committee apparently had protested against the 
whole secretive procedure of Goedhart's dispatch. This had put the party chairman in a 
difficult position. Furthermore, Vorrink did not want to expose the party to the criticism of 
other parties. Already, questions had been raised as to whether the Labor Party was trying 
to set up a second government in Batavia.73 As a result, the party's central committee spe­
cifically stated in Het Vrije Volk that Goedhart had given his statement to the Indonesian 
press on his own initiative.74 Ten days before, Goedhart had received a stem letter from 
Vorrink, written like the earlier one on personal stationery rather than on the party's 
letterhead, in which Goedhart was forbidden to speak any longer about himself as "the 
party's representative" and was again asked to avoid if possible any publicity in the press.75
While Goedhart's movements in Indonesia turned out to be a liability rather than an 
asset to the Labor Party in the Netherlands, in Batavia there was also steadily increasing 
annoyance at his strategy. Initially, Schermerhom was very satisfied with the delegate's 
work, having been rather skeptical beforehand about Goedhart's possible success and 
expecting that Goedhart and the party's opposition would now reach the conclusion that 
the situation was utterly "hopeless." At that time, Van Mook, too, had appreciated Goed­
hart's actions.76 Yet, gradually Schermerhom's enthusiasm gave way to deep concern, 
starting with Goedhart's proud announcement that, as he was being provided lodgings in 
Batavia by the Republic, he was "Sjahrir's guest" now. An irritated Schermerhom told him 
that to state this in public was not only untrue but also highly damaging to the party.77
At the end of the first week of July, the atmosphere seemed completely mined. By that 
time, Goedhart was deeply disappointed in his lack of effectiveness. He complained to 
Schermerhom about obstruction by the Commission General in providing the necessary 
information to fulfill his task as a "political observer."78 Schermerhom had entirely lost faith 
in Goedhart's diplomatic skills. He felt that the party's delegate had only strengthened the 
resistance in Yogyakarta to the Dutch by stating to journalists that, should a military conflict
come too late. It was not published in the Indonesian press until June 27. Schermerhom speculated that it was 
not even known in Yogyakarta by that time. Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, p. 672 [June 27,1947].
72 [F. J. Goedhart], "Het standpunt van de Partij van de Arbeid" [July 9,1947]. ARAII, arch. Goedhart, 
Indonesia
73 J. J. Vorrink to F.J. Goedhart, July 9,1947. Ibid., corr. Indonesia In the party executive's gathering of July 19, 
1947, Vorrink had to defend the decision to send Goedhart to Indonesia. IISG, arch. PvdA, PB, 1947.
74 Het Vrije Volk, July 20,1947.
75 J. J. Vorrink to F. J. Goedhart, July 9,1947. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
7  ^Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, p. 668 [June 23,1947].
77 W. Schermerhom to J.J. Vorrink, June 26,1947. Van der Wal, Offidele bescheiden, 9: 473-74; Smit, Het dagboek 
van Schermerhom, p. 672 [June 27,1947]. Goedhart was lodged in one of the Republican government houses, not 
in Sjahrir's private home.
73 F. J. Goedhart to W. Schermerhom, July 7,1947. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
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break out, the present Dutch cabinet would have to resign, in view of the overwhelming 
Dutch domestic opposition to war. Goedhart had argued that, in that event, the cabinet 
would presumably be replaced by a more conservative one, while at the same time massive 
strikes would break out.79 Hearing this, Van Poll, the representative of the Catholic Party in 
the Commission General, took Goedhart to task, telling him in a meeting of the Commission 
General that such behavior by the cabinet's ministers, after having reached a joint decision, 
would be very cowardly. He reproached Goedhart for being disloyal to the nation by 
strengthening the resistance to the Dutch in Yogyakarta. Moreover, by suggesting that in 
the Netherlands the forces of "reaction" had gained victory, he had limited the ability of the 
Dutch negotiators to profit from a situation where foreign powers had to recognize that 
even those Dutch who had tried hard to reach an agreement were now convinced of the 
necessity of a military action. In sum, Goedhart was politically "incompetent."80 Not only 
Schermerhom and Van Poll, but also the military leaders81 and the Dutch press in Batavia, 
were very embarrassed by Goedhart's diplomatic approach. The Nieuwsgier published a 
rather hostile article by its influential editor-in-chief J.H. Ritman.82 Goedhart was extremely 
angry about this article, mainly perhaps because he was starting to realize, bit by bit, that 
his ambition to be instrumental in reaching an agreement seemed destined for failure.83
Since Goedhart's arrival in Batavia, the negotiations between the Dutch and the Repub­
lic had dragged on. As a result of his concessions to the Dutch, Sjahrir had to resign on June 
26. Two days later, the American Consul General in Batavia tried to bring the two sides 
together again. Sukarno showed a willingness to comply with the Dutch proposals. Accord­
ingly, the Dutch gave Ali Budiardjo, the secretary of the Republic's delegation, a letter 
asking for an immediate clear answer from the Republic. Goedhart had proposed that 
Schermerhom accompany Budiardjo to Yogyakarta, but Schermerhorn did not want a 
socialist Dutchman interfering in the process of decision making in the Republic.84 Van 
Mook considered the Republic's answer, which arrived on July 5, unsatisfactory. Setiadjit 
and Leimena, both members of the Republic's new government, returned to Yogyakarta to 
try to obtain a better response.
During most of these crucial first days of July, Goedhart stayed in Yogyakarta. On July 
3, he met Sjarifuddin, the new Republican prime minister. That afternoon he held a press 
conference, warning the Republic about the adverse effects of its evasive and indistinct 
answers to Dutch proposals and questions. The next day, he had a "straight talk" with 
Setiadjit, now vice-prime minister, who was willing to yield to the Dutch as a result of 
American and English diplomacy. On July 4 and 5, he met Sukarno, who invited him to 
accompany him on a journey through East and West Java; he saw Sjahrir, Sjarifuddin, and
79 Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, p. 744 [July 8,1947].
80 M.J.M. van Poll to L.J.M. Beel [minister-president], July 7,1947. Van der Wal, O fftake bescheiden, 9:605. At first 
Schermerhom did not believe that Goedhart had really said this. But after Goedhart's "confession" he was very 
angry about the affair. Cf. Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, p. 709 [July 2,1947] and pp. 744-45 [July 8,1947],
81 These leaders asked Schermerhom when Goedhart would finally leave. Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, p. 
745 [July 8,1947],
82 Its title was "Hoen kakelt weer" ["The chicken cackled again"]. By "chicken" Ritman referred to Goedhart's 
pen name, "'t Hoen," during and after the war.
83 Schermerhorn had noticed that on July 8, two days after his return from Yogyakarta, Goedhart criticized the 
Republic's politicians for the first time. Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, p. 745 [July 8,1947].
84 Ibid., p. 700 [June 30,1947],
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Setiadjit again, and spoke with Tanzil, Gani, and other prominent politicians. The next day 
he returned to Batavia.85
Meanwhile, Goedhart had duly informed Vorrink about important current events, such 
as Sjahrir's resignation.86 On July 4, he sent a telegram stating that he had found Sjarifuddin 
determined to continue Sjahrir's "diplomas?' policy, apparently with the aim of dispelling 
worried feelings in the Netherlands and in Batavia about the Sjarifuddin government.87 
Two days later, he declared in a telegram that Sukarno had expressed confidence in the 
Dutch Labor Party's willingness to reach a peaceful solution. He was, however, disappoint­
ed that the party had not yet succeeded in reducing Dutch military forces in Indonesia. Such 
a gesture could have improved the mutual relationship. On July 10, two days after Setia- 
djit's return to Batavia, Goedhart advised Vorrink that the Dutch government should 
immediately appoint a federal government, and at the same time start demobilizing the 
Dutch forces in Indonesisa. The Republic, he argued, had almost capitulated to the Dutch; 
now, in return, the Dutch had to show some consideration.
In his telegrams and reports to the Netherlands, Goedhart urged Vorrink to be patient, 
to fill the vacant post in the Commission General with somebody who really understood the 
situation,88 and to transfer the authority to decide on military action from Van Mook to the 
Commission General,89 a suggestion that was completely unrealistic. By that time Goedhart 
had, however, become a fervent opponent of Van Mook, whom he considered to belong to 
the warmongers in Batavia, eager to attack the Republic. While Goedhart had been very 
close to Van Mook during his earlier stay in Indonesia in 1946, a year later he was initially 
not even received by the Lieutenant Governor General.90
On July 15, a peaceful solution of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict seemed near. The next 
day, Setiadjit asked for some more time for his government to deliberate about the Dutch 
proposals. The answer that reached Batavia two days later was unacceptable to the Dutch.
In a telegram to The Hague, Van Mook said that there was nothing left for him but military 
action. On July 18, Setiadjit went back to Yogyakarta to try once more to get the Dutch 
proposals fully accepted. That day, Goedhart launched a final attempt to avert the impend­
ing military action. In a telegram to Vorrink, he urged him to seek the intervention of "an 
international personality, respected by both parties, from an impartial country like Canada 
or Switzerland." He emphasized that the present situation was not brought about by the
85 [F. J. Goedhart], "Reports [to Vorrink]," no. 3 and 4. ARAII, arch. Goedhart, Indonesie; cf. IISG, arch. PvdA, 
1947, com. 2, portfolio 25.
86 This was the telegram that Vorrink personally gave to Beel and others and whose contents were published on 
the following day in Het Parool.
87 Schermerhom called this message "hopeful" in his diary. Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhorn, p. 713 [July 3, 
1947].
88 Goedhart suggested appointing instead F. de Boer, who resigned in March 1947, M. de Niet, or A. M. Joekes. 
The first was a relatively independent Catholic missionary and the second a prominent, originally liberal, 
socialist member of Parliament, who was considered to be one of the party's Indonesia "experts."
89 Since July 2, Goedhart had known that Van Mook was authorized by the Dutch government to start a military 
action when he deemed this necessary. Could it be, Goedhart thought, that his mission was after all only a put- 
up job? He posed this question to Vorrink in his report to him, July 2,1947. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. 
Indonesie. Cf. Schenkman, De Irtdonesie-reizen van Goedhart, p. 35.
90 F. J. Goedhart to W. Schermerhom, July 7,1947. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesie. On the letter had 
been written [presumably by Van Mook, who had still not received Goedhart at that time]: "He is apparently 
angry. That is of no use to me, because this hurts the Dutch cause. In that case this mission will fail in its 
purpose. Let him come and tell you what you think about it."
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malevolence of the Republic, but resulted from the Dutch demand that Dutch military 
forces be admitted to the territory of the Republic. This was feared by the Republic as an 
attack on its de facto authority.91
Although he had a rather low opinion of Goedhart's opinions and accomplishments, 
Vorrink nevertheless made some use of his information and advice. To Vice-Prime Minister 
Drees he mentioned Goedhart's help in persuading the Republic to take a more constructive 
stance, although he ascribed that change mainly to the Americans and the British.92 In a 
letter to the Laborite ministers, he drew information from Goedhart's reports. The minister 
of Overseas Territories was permitted to inform the minister of Foreign Affairs about Goed­
hart's July 14 telegram in which Goedhart had given an account of his interview with 
Mitcheson, the British Consul General. Mitcheson had shown great disappointment about 
the stubborn attitude of the Dutch in the face of the British and American initiatives to 
overcome the deadlock in the negotiations. Apparently, Vorrink did not consider Goed­
hart's reporting very opportune for the party, and did not send Goedhart's reports and 
telegrams to the party's central committee and the socialist members of Parliament until 
July 18.93 By then, however, it was too late for Goedhart's points of view to exert any influ­
ence. Tragically, his last passionate attempt to avoid military action—urging Vorrink to ask 
for international intervention—had quite the opposite effect on Vorrink and the party's cen­
tral committee. They drew the conclusion that even Goedhart could no longer envisage a 
peaceful solution. International intervention at that moment, and by countries like Canada 
or Switzerland, was not regarded as politically viable.94
Two days later, on July 20,1947, the Dutch military attack—the so-called first Police 
Action—was launched. That night, Goedhart was arrested by soldiers of the Dutch East 
Indies Army at the home of his friends in Jalan Bonang, where he was staying. He could not 
help thinking back to the days of the German occupation. Soon, one of the Dutch officers 
offered him his apologies and released him. In the morning, Goedhart went through the 
gardens to SjahriPs house where he met Gani, Tanzil, and others, being guarded by Captain 
Westerling. He shook hands with them and professed how terrible and useless this Police 
Action appeared to him.95 That same day, July 21, he wrote Schermerhom a letter:
Last night, Dutch soldiers have been dispatched by Van Mook [the head of the govern­
ment of the Dutch East Indies], authorized by the Dutch government in The Hague, of 
which six ministers are members of the Labor Party. I am strongly convinced that the 
socialist masses of our people will oppose this colonial war that was declared on behalf 
of the Labor Party as well. We face a terrible crisis. The incompetence of the socialist 
leaders, their impotence, their failure to defy the bourgeois reaction, and the fact that 
some leaders of the party are not real socialists at all vindicate themselves now. Because 
of the countless faults made by our party, the warmongers could no longer be resisted. 
As a result, they are now trying to solve the Dutch-Indonesian conflict by force. This is 
insane and utterly hopeless. This "restricted military action" will only intensify the
91 [F. J. Goedhart], Telegram, July 18,1947. Ibid., Indonesia.
92 J. J. Vorrink to Drees, June 29,1947. ARAII, arch. Drees, no. 505, corr.
93 J. J. Vorrink to party members, July 18,1947. IISG, arch. PvdA, com. 2, map 25. Apparently, Vorrink had at 
that time not yet received Goedhart's last three reports, one dated July 12 and two dated July 13. ARA II, arch. 
Goedhart, Indonesie.
94 Smit, Het dagboek van Schermerhom, pp. 807-8 [August 10,1947], 820 [August 19,1947]. Cf. Schenkman, De 
Indonesie-reizen van Goedhart, p. 37.
95 F. J. Goedhart to R. Alwi, January 1,1948. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesie; Het Vrije Volk, July 22,1947.
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aversion, the distrust and the hatred felt by the Indonesians toward us. They can be 
beaten by military force, but the willingness of the Republic to cooperate voluntarily 
with the Netherlands will vanish completely. The Dutch are doing this out of despair: to 
nobody's benefit. Guerrilla warfare must be anticipated with unforeseen attacks on our 
army's extended supply lines. Acts of resistance, assaults, and arson against everything 
Dutch will occur. The party leadership in The Hague can boast of its complicity in this 
adventure and this bloodbath, being justified by nothing more than by the lack of pa­
tience, the presumptuousness, and colonial arrogance of the blanda [Dutch] community 
in Batavia and its many strongholds in the Netherlands.
I no longer have a task. The Labor Party that sent me to this country on a goodwill 
mission, in order to strengthen the confidence of the Indonesian people in the Dutch 
socialist party, this same Labor Party collaborated in this attack on the Republic with 
tanks and bombers six weeks later. Face to face with my many Indonesian friends I feel 
deeply embarrassed. I am going back to Holland as soon as possible to induce the mass 
of our party to revolt against the failed party leadership.96
This emotional letter came from a man who had just seen the dissipation of his struggle to 
mediate successfully in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict that had dominated the Dutch politi­
cal agenda for the preceding two years. The letter reveals the author's typical hyperbolic 
style of writing.97 Although the letter was addressed to Schermerhom, Goedhart did not 
keep its contents strictly confidential. A copy was also sent to his political friends Jacques de 
Kadt and Sal Tas.98 He returned to the Netherlands as quickly as possible. On July 25 he 
was back in the country.
The Aftermath
After the Police Action, the Labor Party held an extraordinary congress on August 15 and 16 
in order to let the party's rank and file cool down. The view of the party's opposition on the 
matter was presented by their spokesman, De Kadt. Again, out of fear of a split in the party, 
the congress members, although not explicitly approving the party line, did not deliver a 
statement of disapproval either.99 Despite the debate that arose between the opposition and 
the party leadership over the right interpretation of the congress' resolution, it was clear 
that most of the opposition was prepared to follow the party leadership. By keeping the 
Labor Party in the government, it was hoped that a further escalation of the conflict could 
be prevented and a solution found along the lines of the Linggadjati Agreement. Only a few 
members who opposed the party's line felt that the Labor Party's support of the Police 
Action should have resulted in their resigning from the party.
Goedhart, on the contrary, considered that remaining a member of the party was evi­
dence of "political realism," because there was only one socialist party in the Netherlands. 
He did not want to be sidetracked, but preferred to win the party over to his stand, induc­
ing the party leadership to a more radical Indonesia policy and a tougher line toward its
96 F. J. Goedhart to W. Schermerhom, July 21,1947. Ibid.
97 Exceedingly striking is the analogy in composition and style between this letter and the first Newsletter that 
Goedhart published in July 1940. De Keizer, Het Parool 1940-1945, pp. 16,43-44.
98 Goedhart had written their names on his own copy of the letter.
99Verslag van het Partijbestuur van de Partij van de Arbeid overdejaren 1947 en 1948 [Report of the party executive of 
the Dutch Labor Party 1947-1948] (Amsterdam, 1948), 196-197.
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Roman Catholic coalition partner.100 He did not consider himself co-responsible for the 
military action, probably agreeing with De Kadt, who wrote in September 1947 that he,
although co-responsible for the viewpoint of the party council and, consequently, for the 
policy of the party and the Dutch government as well, delegated this responsibility for a 
policy that he had always withstood and of whose consequences he has always warned 
(though never able to exert any influence on the party leadership nor on the implemen­
tation of its policy) without delay to the leaders, who have power and must be held 
truly responsible.101
After the party congress, Goedhart fell seriously ill. He was physically and psychologically 
exhausted.102 He had reached the moment of truth. Being strongly aware of his very embar­
rassing position as, a powerless member of a party that in the end turned out to be co- 
responsible for a colonial war, he blamed the personal and political weakness of others. In 
October 1947, he wrote to De Graaff that the Indonesian cause seemed completely lost 
because of the Dutch government's lack of understanding. The Dutch Labor Party no longer 
had any effective power. Its ministers almost embraced the reactionary viewpoints of the 
Dutch colonialist conservatives. One minister held the opinion that one had to govern at 
any cost; a second stated that one had to confront the Indonesian Republic in order to 
safeguard Dutch economic interests; a third did not want to abandon the Dutch East Indies 
at all; and a fourth appeared less a Labor minister than an "orangist [royalist] liberal." The 
party's chairman and the leader of the socialists in Parliament were so keen about maintain­
ing the government coalition that they did everything to avoid a crisis.103 Compelled to 
choose between the Dutch and the Indonesian cause in the summer of 1947, the middleman 
must have realized that he had no alternative but to serve the first of these.
Conclusion
Goedhart's painful Indonesia experience in the first two years of the Dutch-Indonesian 
conflict, which culminated in the summer of 1947 in the complete failure of his activities as a 
middleman, is more than just another striking manifestation of the well-known traumatic 
ambiguity in the makeup of a go-between. It also pathetically highlights the ambivalence of 
European socialist anticolonialist ideology. In spite of its sympathy with the nationalist 
struggle against colonial rule, Dutch social democracy clung to an anticolonialist point of 
view that permitted the subordination of nationalism in Indonesia to Dutch political and 
economic interests. Consequently, facing the colonial challenge to postwar Dutch politics 
and society, socialist politicians could not but take refuge in a highly flexible Eurocentric 
rhetoric.
This essay has attempted to redress a balance of interpretation. Dutch historiography 
has always honored as the "conscience" of the party the few Labor Party politicians who 
strongly opposed the party leadership's Indonesia policy, holding them in high regard 
because of their outspoken and realistic anticolonial standpoint. To quote its foremost 
historian J.Th.M. Bank:
100 Goedhart had stated this to Schermerhorn. Ibid., p. 782 [July 25,1947]; F. J. Goedhart to R. Alwi, January 1, 
1948. ARAII, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia.
101 De Kadt, '"Rampspoed geboren" [The Disaster has broken out], pp. 300-301. This essay is dated September 6, 
1947.
102 M.A.A. W. Goedhart-van Alebeek to J. de Graaff, September 3,1947. ARA II, arch. Goedhart, corr. Indonesia
103 F. J. Goedhart to J. de Graaff, October 25,1947. Ibid.
138 Madelon de Keizer
With regard to his views on the decolonization of Indonesia and the (missed) chances of
the Netherlands, he [J. de Kadt] was far ahead of his compatriots, and far ahead of most
of his fellow party members as well. He was right and he would be proved right.104
In the previous pages, a reassessment of this position has been made by analyzing Goed­
hart's actual political and ideological involvement as a middleman in the Dutch-Indonesian 
question.
Goedhart's mediation displayed a calculated policy, if not a pattern in a middleman's 
perceptions and behavior. After having fulfilled the first task of the go-between by crossing 
the border (his visit to Yogyakarta in 1946), he continued relentlessly trying to enhance the 
mutual understanding between the partners in conflict, to sweeten their bitterness and 
soften their hatred toward each other, and to persuade them to take a less intransigent 
position in the negotiations, by translating, excusing, and explaining in Indonesia the 
exigencies of the domestic policy of the Netherlands, and vice versa.
Definite elements in Goedhart's character and political past stimulated him to play the 
middleman's role. Preeminently a political activist and an individualist, he was too impa­
tient to go along with the necessities of parliamentary decision making. Although a con­
vinced democrat, he loathed the slow and bureaucratic procedures of Parliament, which, in 
his opinion, obstructed government's ability to rule efficiently. Rejecting legalism and 
caution, he embraced dynamic political strategies, nonconformism, and the use of imagina­
tion in guiding political processes. His experiences as a Communist and, not least, a brave 
resistance worker had made him suspicious of all authority and stimulated this creative 
political approach.
Goedhart's mediation was defined by his specific ideological position in the Labor 
Party. He belonged to a group of former independent socialists and other democratic party 
members, who, though not socialists by origin, welcomed the new Labor Party's intended 
nondogmatic, progressive, and democratic political line, which enabled it to participate in 
government. Regarding the Dutch-Indonesian conflict as a barrier to the renewal of Dutch 
politics and society, these people strongly advocated a quick solution.
The interpretation of the Indonesian revolution as a "just war," analogous to the Dutch 
struggle for independence in the sixteenth century and also during the German occupation, 
was at the root of the group's decolonization policy, which was based on an amalgam of 
common sense arguments and political pragmatism. Time and again, Goedhart brought to 
the fore the idea that socialists should support the nationalist struggle in Indonesia because 
of "historical justice," or claimed that a nation of 75 million people could not be ruled by 
one of 9 million people; he referred to the economic advantages the Dutch would enjoy after 
loosening their bonds with Indonesia, and pointed out the weak political situation of the 
Netherlands vis-a-vis the Anglo-American alliance that strongly favored an agreement with 
the Indonesian Republic. This pragmatic anticolonial rhetoric was highly functional. It 
maintained socialist anticolonialism on the one hand while demonstrating the Labor Party's 
goodwill to Indonesian nationalists on the other, but at the same time it permitted the party 
to follow a political course that secured its present position.
The political career of Goedhart and other "pragmatic" anticolonialists pointedly illus­
trates that their arguments in favor of Indonesia's independence did not stop them from 
always following the party line in the end. Both the amendments to the Linggadjati Agree­
104 J.Th.M. Bank in the epilogue to the republication in 1989 of J. de Kadt's De Indonesische tragedie, p. 186. Bank 
refers in this quotation to the subtitle of De Kadt's book, The tragedy of missed chances.
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ment and Van Mook's federalism were accepted by them, just like, finally, the launching of 
the first Police Action, because these moves did not essentially affect their pragmatic anti­
colonial discourse nor interfere with the party's prime objectives. The "pragmatists" 
masked their ultimate loyalty to the party by pointing to the leadership as responsible for 
measures they themselves, although under protest, sanctioned, and by denouncing Dutch 
decolonization politics on the whole as consisting of "missed chances" by both the Labor 
Party and the Catholic Party.
Although aware of the fact that Indonesia was experiencing a national and social revolu­
tion, Goedhart, De Kadt, and other "pragmatists" never really understood the weight of 
what was happening in Indonesia nor the political realities with which the Indonesian 
politicians had to cope. Like most Dutch socialists, they were inclined to overestimate the 
political strength of the socialists in Yogyakarta in this period, underestimating other polit­
ically operative strains. As long as a reasonable, Western-oriented, and moderate socialist 
like Sjahrir led the government, the striving of the nationalists was seen as deserving all 
help. In that case, the Labor Party had to stimulate mutual trust and understanding, which, 
combined with the goodwill and generosity of some key figures in the political process on 
both sides, were considered to be major factors in solving the conflict. In this policy the 
undisputable right of Indonesia to the status of a self-governing country was emphasized. 
After the launching of the first Police Action in the summer of 1947, this position was no 
longer credible. By that time, however, the "pragmatists" were embracing a "Cold War" 
notion of decolonization, which saw Indonesia's eventual full sovereignty as conditional on 
its professed and exclusive economic and political alliance with the countries of the Western 
democratic world. This new concept generated a new rhetoric that enabled them to accept 
the party leadership's expedient Indonesia policy without essentially changing their former 
anticolonialist position.
